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PREFACE

A irlift is a responsibility tha t could be, like the space effort,
either p re dominantly mil itary or civi lian .

The ec onomi cs of air -

l ift is of such importance that this responsibility cannot b e proper l y
assesse d without including th e strategic and political factors also .
This study was undertaken to atte mpt to establish a n airlift
polic y tha t would incorporate a ll of the above factors and yet be mor e
dfic.ient than a policy which gave the responsib ility of airlift so lely to
the military, or to the commercial carriers .
The author's interest was stimulate d by twenty years of military
service, eight of which was in the Military Air Transport S ervice
(MATS) .

Durin g this period the author made numerous trips to Air

Fo rce D epots, in the United S tates and overseas , to co - ordinate maintenance matt ers for P acific Division, MATS.

He was the maintenance

representative for P acific D ivision, MAT S , on the Civil Reserv e Air
F l eet (CRAF ) pro g ram, and as such c ondu cte d investigations throughout the P acifi c area on t he condition of CRAF facilities .

i
i

However, re l iance on the opinions of p e rsons knowledgeable in
aviation was made, and special acknowl e d gement is due the following

ll

p ersons whose views are wide l y respecte d in aviation circles:

Honorable A . M. Monrone y , S enator, Ok l ahoma
James E . Moore, Vice P resident-Traffic, United Air L ines
Robert W. S mart, Ch ie f Counsel for Armed S ervices Committee,
House of Representatives
C. R . Smith, Chairman of Board, American A irlines

lll

CHAPTER I
INTR O DUCTION

Purpos e .-- The purposes of this paper are to analyze past airlift conditions, show why airlift should be adopted, and to d etermine an
effective airlift policy and method of operation that would provi d e the
Un ited States an economical, flexible, and efficient a irlift force, helping to ensure the security of the nation .

Scop e. --This study will be concerned with the development of an
effective airlift policy.

It will determine which type of airlift force

would be most e ffici ent --pr imari l y military, a balanced force of militar y and commercial carriers , or, primarily comm ercial.

Obviously,

however, there are factors other than economic ones which have to be
consid ered in the final specifications of an airlift force; these are political and strategic factors .

For instanc e , if one decision required the

closing of a military base in a community, there would probably be opposition from members of Congress serving that district.

An exce llent

of the type of Congressional protest that may dev e l op is the opposition
recently given to S ecretary of D efense Robert W. M c Namara in his proposa ls to close some naval shipyards on the east coast .

There could be

opposition for strategic reasons from the Joint Chiefs of Staff if the reac-
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tion time of the co m mercial carriers was not what the J oint C hiefs
considered accep t a b l e .
Objectives of A ir lift . --In evaluating the na tio n ' s a i r lift f orce and
methods of operat i on i t i s necessary f irst to d e t ermine what this air l ift force should h ave as ob jectives .

The n a tional g o a l s sel ect e d by t h e

author are ones tha t sho uld serve t he nation as a who l e, and they are by
no means the onl y ones app li cab l e . They were cho sen a fter c onsid ering
the entire air lift re s ources of the Un i ted S tates as b eing avail ab l e for
service .

1.

The goa ls selected are the fo llowing :
R ecognition that a i rlift, because of i ts abili ty to d ep l oy per sonnel in l a r ge force quickl y to any p l ace i n th e wor ld , serves
as an a r m of t he Unit e d S tat es in car r ying out its foreign p oli cy .
The Military A ir Transpo rt S ervice (MATS ) ha s b een ut ili ze d
in this capac i ty i n the past .

The exam p l es li ste d be l ow, which

ind icate h ow airlif t has been u se d as an i ns t rum ent o f nati on al
p oli cy to influ ence w o r l d opinion, h ave b een ext ract e d f rom a n
undate d MATS l etter , " W h a t I s Glob a l A irlift ? "
a.

Mo v em ent of this nation ' s mi ghti es t op e r a tio nal miss iles .

b.

Rap id strategi c d eployme nt of this nation 's m ili t ary strike
fo rce s t o wherever in the w or l d t h ey are n ee d e d .

c.

F ast reaction to war a l er t to p ro du ce a c on ti nuo us flo w o f
e q uipm ent to armed. forces a l ready a t the front , an d t o re supply our acti ve com bat elem ent s .
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d.

Sp ecial mis s ions into r e mote areas with high - valu e and
d elicate scientific e quipment, or with urgently neede d
replacement items .

e.

A irdropping of supplies to re mote scientific stations near
the So uth P o l e, the Ar ctic Circle, and in other areas of
the world; airdropping of foodstuffs, an d supplies, and
even pararescuemen to d isaster sites around the wor ld;
and ai rdrop ping of paratroopers and combat weapons
from formations of airlift aircraft.

f.

Humanitarian airlift of sup p l ies , m e di cal e quipment,
communi cat ion e quipment , rescue and surviv a l and

m e dical speciali sts to countri es hard hit b y natura l
dis aste rs or epid e mics.

g.

A erom e d ical evac uation missions across both oceans

(and within the Unite d States ) .
h.

Routin e resuppl y daily over 11 5, 000 mil es of air routes
to D epartment of Defense combat forces throughout the
free wo r ld.

r

i.

Massive exercises, moving thousands of army troops
and hundr e d s of tons of combat gear to and f rom mane uvers, both in this co unt ry and overseas .

j.

Imm e diate, m assive airlifts as an instrument of na tio nal
d efense policy, such as the renowne d Berlin Airlift in
1948 and the now-famous Congo air l ift which began in
J ul y, 1960 , for the United States.

4

2.

An airlift force that has the capability of immediate
res ponse to any changes in strategy with sufficient flexib ility to meet any emergencies .

3.

The d eve l opm ent an d support of a healthy aircraft industry
to aid in the grow th of the nation ' s eco n omi c an d industrial
capacity .

With the establishm ent of the national goals as a guide to aid in
the deve lopment of a realistic a irlift policy, a review of airlift backg round and history is appropriate .
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CHAPTER II
DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY AIRLIFT
History. --The d eve l opment of airlift as a primar y means of
transportation has a re l atively short history; however, it has been
an orderl y one .

The advent of the twin-engine DC- 2, in 1 932, gave

the country its first promise of airlift potential. 1 After the production of 1 3 0 DC-2 1 s , Donald Dou g la s, P resident of newl y formed
Dou gla s Aircl"aft Company, took a fi::1ancial gamble and began production of the DC- 3, which was to make a remarkabl e record in Wor l d
War II as a cargo transport.

Th e DC- 3, a twin-engine transport, car-

ried a total of 2 1 passengers and was the first airplane that permitted
the air lines to make a profit . 2
W orld W ar II accelerated th e development of the four-engine
transport aircraft, the Do ugla s DC-4 , which was widely used b y the
"Air Transport Command," the forerunner of MATS.

During the Berlin

Ai rlift, the Do uglas DC-4 was again used as the primary aircraft for
suppl ying the city of Berlin.

However, more advanced four-engine

transport aircraft made their appearance, s uch as the Dou gl as DC-6
and the Boeing Stratocruiser .

These aircraft could carry lar ger pay-

1 P oyntz Tyler, Airways of Ameri ca (N ew York : H. W. Wilson Co.,
1958 ), p. 3 1.
2Ibid.' p . 32.
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loads, and consequently cou ld d o the sam e job as the DC- 4 with fewer
aircraft .
The D oug la s C -1 24, a four-engine transport aircraft capabl e of
carrying l arger paylo ad s than any aircraft then in service, made its
debut d uring the Kor ean War, and it was the first time an aircraft was
specifica lly des igne d for air liftin g cargo .

Althou gh the C-124 increased

payl oad capacity considerably over the previous transport aircraft, it
became apparent that this aircraft still was not the ultimate one for airlift because of excessive operating and maintenance costs . 3

In 1957 1V'.ATS began using the C-133, a lar ge tra.n3-0cear.ic, fourengine turbo -prop aircraft capabl e of carrying in excess of 30 tons of
cargo .

This aircraft was procured to carry the "out-size cargo, " which

is the cargo too lar ge to be carried in oth er transport aircraft.
Propeller-dnven aircraft were not enough, however, and in 19 60
a subcommittee of the House Armed S ervices Committee condu cted hear ings which exposed the inadequacy of MATS to perform its "Hard- core
Mi ssion . " 4 The Sub committee initiated an interim modernization program which, when compl eted, will add 50 C - l30E l ong range, four engine turbo - prop aircraft and 30 C-135 l ong range pure jet aircraft to
MATS' air lift force. 5 The above aircraft, add ed to the propeller

3u. S. Congress, S enate, S tud y of Militar y Air Transport S ervice,
85th Cong ., 2nd S ess . , 1958, p . 33.
4 u. S. Congress, S enate, National Militar y Airlift, 86th Con g ., 2nd
S ess . , 1 960, p. 4033 .
5 Ibid.' p. 4048.
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aircraft a lr ead y possesse d, will increase MATS' capabi lity to provide
air lift until such time as the C-141, a l ong range , f ou r - engine jet transport capable of airlifting 68 , 5 00 pounds, is delivered.
The history of airlift deve l opment has been rapi d; and, with the
d elivery of the C-141, it will h ave n ot onl y strategic and politica l value
but economical value as we ll.
Ba ckground o f MAT S. --MATS was organize d in 1948 as one of the
major command s within the newly created Air F orce .

P rior to this time

military airlift was performed by two organizations: the A ir Transport
Command (ATC ) o f the A rmy Air Forc e and the Naval Air Transpo"t
S ervice (NATS).

Ther e were three air transport d ivi sions set up with-

in MATS in 1948, and these were maintained until 1960.

They were the

In 1960 MATS reorganize d

Atl antic, Continental, and P acific D ivisions .

its tr a n sport structure, and Contin ental D ivision was d eac t ivated .

Its

area of responsibi lity was absorbed b y th.e Atlantic a n d Pac ific Divisions.
A t lantic D ivision was renamed Eastern Transport Ai r For ce (EAS T AF)
and Pa cific D ivision was renamed W es t ern Transport Ai r Force (WESTAF).
Unqu estio nably MAT S h a s been fl ying passengers and cargo that
could be air lift e d b y commercial carriers.

MATS continues to d o this.

How ever, it shou ld be expl ained that the D ep artment of D efense, through
the Joint Chi e fs of Staff, is responsible for the assignm e nt to MATS of
what will be airlifte d within a specifie d period of time.

In the past, if

MAT S was not cap able of air lifting the re qui rement, the excess was
airlifted b y commercial carriers on contract .

8
MATS was the object of considerable opposition from the com mercial carriers and some members of Congress.

T his opposition

led to the "Stud y of the Militar y Air Transport S ervice " 6 conducted
by the Committee on Interstate and F oreign Commerce of the Unite d
S tates S enate .

It s purpos e was to expl ore the possibilities of giving

to the commercial carriers the air lift that would be compatibl e with
their operation.

As a resu lt of these and subse qu ent hearings, a ddi-

tional airlift has been as signe d to the comm erci a l carriers .

Each

passing year has seen an increase in a ir l ift provide d b y the c omm er cial ca.rl."ier s since 1959, as can be seem in App endix C.
S ummary. -- The d eve l opment of transport aircraft has been an
orderly one.

How ever, the economics of airlift was not given equal

consid eration with the political and strategic factors until the acquisition of the interim modernization aircraft.

The c omme rcial c a rr i ers

brought to li ght the importance of ec onomics of airlift in the late 1 95 0' s .
Consequentl y , it i s taken into consideration in the deve l opment of any
new transport aircraft .

6u.s. Con gre ss, S enate, S tudy of the Military A ir T ran sport
S ervice , 85th Gong., 2n d S ess . , 19 58 .

9

CHAP TER III
APPLICATIO N OF AIRLIFT
A irlift Ad vantages . --Airlift has d efinite economic advanta ges
over surface transportation because of its speed, flexibility , extended
range, and reduction of packa ging and crating requirements.

Because

of these advantages , economic gains are possible, and one of the major
areas in which c onsiderabl e gains have been made is that of l ogistics.
Tl-:e importanc" of l ogisti ;:; s in achievin g economic gain.s is sho·m1
in the maintenance of spare parts inventories .

The cost of spare parts

for aircraft increases with technol ogical imp rovements because the parts
become more co mplecated and therefore cost more.

A large portion of

an inventory may becom e practically worthl ess because of techno l ogical
changes that no longer require those particu l ar spare parts . 1 A means
of l owering this cost of obsolescence is by reducing the size of the in ventor y of spare parts.

The airlift of spare parts, both in the United

States and overseas, has permitted a re ducti on i n the inventory of spares
by increasing the spee d and range of transport aircraft.

This has de-

crease d the en route time of s p are parts from sixteen days to two d ays,
thereby d ecreasing the inventor y re q uirements .

This is shown in App endix B.

1u. S. A . F., Spares S tudy Group, Sele c tive Man a gement of Material,
Dayton: 1960, Report No. 10.
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The Air Force has reduced the spare parts inventory at overseas depots
to zero according to Gen eral William McKee, Vice Chief of Staff, United
States Air Force. 2 This resulted in closing five depots located in Africa,
England, Japan, and the Philippin es .
Airlift, through the medium of speed, permits maintaining the minimum number of any item for the Air Force; therefore, it should have
comparable results for the Arm y and Navy in the words of General John
P. Do y l e, formerly Director of Transportation , United States Air Forc e . 3
According to General Doyle the Army had asked for airlift of $6 million
per month and the Air Force could not provide it .

With the interim air-

craft provided MATS, the C-135 and C-l30E, increased airlift should be
available for the Arm y and Navy.

Though airlift was dir ect l y responsible

for the re du ction of spare parts requirements and closin g the five major
over seas depots, there can be no doubt that efficient inventory control
procedures were a lso instrumental in the economic gains achieved.

In-

ventory contro l procedures have accelerated the requisitioning and processing of spare parts .

In the past, an Air Force base lo cated overseas

wou ld compl ete a requisition form and sen d it to the area depot; if the
area depot had the s pare part it would be shipped to the base that needed
it.

If the d epot did not have the part in stock, it would submit the re-

quisition to the depot in the United States that was responsible for provi din g that particu l ar part.

The depot in the United S tates wou ld ship

2"Administrator," Air Fo rce Times, July 29, 1 964, p . 5.
3u .s. Congress, S enate , S tudy of Militar y Air Transport
S ervice, 85th Con g., 2nd S ess . , 1958, p . 193.
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the part to the overseas depot for trans - shipment to the original base of
request . 4 This procedure required da ys and weeks before receipt of the
spare part could be expected.
Airlift and electronic data processing equipment at Air Force bases
have combine d to reduce the time re quired to get de l ivery on a repl acement
part.

The data processing equipment permits an Air Force base overseas

to make known its needs within a matter of minutes to the depot in the
United S tates.

Airlift is then used to speed the part to the Air Force base.

A look at Table II, Appendix B, which includes data compiled by an
A ir Force Spar es S tu d y Group of the Air Force Lo gistics Command, which
h as the responsibility for procurement and support of all Air Force aircraft, reveals how the expenditure for the initial pur c hase of spares for
new aircraft and the replenishment of spare parts has been decreased by
approximately one-third between the years 1956- 1 96 1.

This reduction,

as a result of airlift and efficient inventory control, does not mean just
a decr ease in inventory levels; it has a directly related effect on the amount of storage space required .

The standard cost fi gure of $2. 25 per

square foot for storage spa ce is contained in Air Force Manual 67- 1 and
it permits a comparison which indicates the potential possible savings
when storage space is reduce d because airiift has reduced the inventory.
Assume, for exampl e, that each overseas Air Force depot had 2 million
square feet of space, the c l osing of five depots would save l 0 mil l ion

4"S uppl y Procedures," Air Force Manual 67- 1, Da yton: 1958.
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square feet of space.

If $ 2 . 25 per squa re foot is multiplied by 10 mil-

lion s quar e f eet it results in a saving of $22. 5 million.

E ven though

this is only a n estimate of the amount of storage space at each of the
five overseas d epots , it is a fair l y ac curate one wh en the responsibi litie s of a depot are consi d ere d: stora ge o f spare parts, gaso line , vehicles, aircraft , and personal e quipm ent .
If airl ift is e xpan d ed to encompas s the re quirements of the A r m y
and Navy it wou ld permit the closing of additional d epots with resultant
savings in inventory re q uirements, storage space, an d personnel .

Norma lly, A ir For ce d epots i n the United States emp loyed between
15 ,000 and 25, 000 personne l while overseas depots h ad a l ower e mplo y ment rate . 5 How ever, for the sake of stan dardization, it will be ass um ed
that each overseas d e pot employed a combin a tion of 8, 000 m ilitar y a n d
civilian personne l.

This wo uld have resulte d in a d ecrease of 4 0, 000 per-

sonnel, which, based on an a nnual average salary per person of $5,000
wou ld be a saving of $200 million per year . 6
The remaining area i n which economic ga ins o ccurre d with the
closing of the five l arge d e pots was i n the expenditu re of operations and
maintenan ce f und s .

T hese expen ditures i nc l ude such ite m s as the c ost

of aviation gasoline, g asoline for a ll type vehicles, road m aintenance,

5 u . S. A. F. , Spares S tudy Group , S e l ec tive Managem ent of M ater ia l ,
Dayton : 1 960 , Report No. 1 0.
6s tanl ey H. Brewer and Ro ger B. Ulvesta d, The C arg o J et In
Militar y Air Transportation (R enton , Wa sh . : 1 96 0) , p . 6 0.
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repair of aircr aft and vehic l es , e l ectricity, water, etc.

An average

figure of $10 million of operation and maintenance money for each of
the five depots which were closed down amounts to a saving of $50 million. 7 Here again, economic gains have been the direct result of airlift, and expans ion to provide the Arm y and Navy air lift to satisfy their
requirements should be accomplished to achieve further economic g ains .
Hi- Valu P rogr am. --Ai rlift has been used by the A ir F orce Lo gis tics Command to support a program which, in essence , procures the
minimum number of aircraft and missile parts and maintains a stli.ct
control over them for the life of the parts.

Airlift is the key to sue-

cess of the progr am , which is called the "Hi- Val u" p rogram .

For

exampl e, a critical part needs repair ; it is air lifte d to the d epot in
the United States that is responsibl e for the repair of that particular
part .

It is repaire d on a priority basis and air lifted back to the base

that needs the part .
The reduction of transportation time has been of critical impor tance in the "Hi- Val u" program.

A s an exampl e , the Air For ce nor -

mally ships ;.pproxim;,_te l y 2 1 aircr aft engines8 per day to ~verseas d estinations and each engine has an initial average cost of
$200, 000; however , some cost as much as $ 5 00, 000 per engine.

It

will be seen that initial investment costs could run quite high if the
engines were shipped by surface transportation .

The Air Forc e

7u . S. A. F. Spares S tudy Group, S elective Management of Material,
Dayton: 1 960, Report No. 10.
8Air Force Form llOB.
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needs to receive 21 engines of various models over seas each da y re gar dless of whether they are delivered b y a irlift or surfac e transport a tion.

To d etermine the re q uire me nt fo r 21 engines per da y it was

necessary t o d e termin e the average engine life at removal of all air craft engines re moved at overseas bases and the average number of
aircraft in the A r m y, A ir Fo rce, and Navy that must be supported.
There are approximately 2, 6 00 Air Fo rce , Arm y, and Navy aircraft
tha t are supporte d by a ir lift . 9 Considering all types of aircraft in
use, the average number of engine s installed on each airc raft would
be two.
(1) Each aircraft averages 1, 200 flying hours per year .
(2) 2 , 6 00 multiplied by 1, 200 ho urs equal s 3, 120, 000 flying
hours per year .
( 3) Each engine averages 800 hours b efore rem oval.
(4 )

3, 120 , 000 fl ying hours per year di v ide d by 800 hours of
engine life e qual 3 , 900 engines.

(5)

3, 9 00 engines multiplie d by 2 engines per aircr aft e qual
7, 800 total engines per year .

(6) 7, 800 engines per year divided by 365 da ys equal 21 engine s
per day. 10
The following data is presented to illustrate the d i ffer ence i n
initial investm ent c os ts between surface transportation a n d airlift for
the aircraft engine s t hat wou ld be in transit at an y particula r time.

9Air Force Form 1 10B.
1 Ocornpil e d from information contained in U.S.A.F. Spa res Stu d y
Group, W right- Patterson AFB , O hi o, 1960 , R eport No. 10.
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Value of One Day 's
E ngines in Shipment
(21 Engines)

Days Required
for Shipment

Number Engines
in Transit

Cost

$4. 2 million

100 (Surface )

2, 100

'$ 42 0 million

$4. 2 million

4 (Airlift)

$ 1 6 . 8 million

84

$40 3. 2 million 11

Differ ence :

The Air Force woul d have to purchase 2, 016 more engines if it
used surface t,:ansportation than it would if airlift were used .

This

means that $403.2 m i llion is saved on the initial investment if airlift
is L!Sed.

When highly comp l ex electronic equipment and parts are con-

sidere d it is apparent that the use of airlift wou ld permit fewer to be
purchased resulting in conside rable savings.
Pa ckaging and Crating . --The Rand Corporation, an independ ent
research organization, complete d a study for the Air Fo rce in 1952 on
the costs of shipment of supplies by surface transportation and by air lift .

One facet of the study pertaine d to the requirements for packaging

and crating necessary for each means of shipment.

It was estimated in

the report that for surface shipment at least 35 per cent of the weight
was for packaging and crating .

It also reported that the crating f or

airlift shipment w a s practicall y nil. 12 T he heavy cra ting tha t is re quired for surface shipment can be a ttributed to stacking the cargo
l ayer upon layer and to the forces exerted on th e cargo du ring the nor-

1lcompiled f ro m info rmation contained in U.S. A. F. Spa res Stu d y
Group, Wright-Patterson AFB, O hi o, 1960, Report No • . 10.
l2u.s. Congr ess , S enate , S tu d y of the Military Air Tran sport
S ervi c e, 85th Gon g., 2nd S ess ., 1958 , p. 10 7.
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mal and sudden starting and stopping which tend to shift the cargo .
Tie-down facilities, which transport aircraft utilize, would probably
reduce the damage to the cargo and therefore reduce the requirement for
crating if uti l ized on surface shipm ents.

It is significant to note a l so that in a study performed by Dou g la s
Aircraft Company on 1. 5 million suppl y items, se l ected at a g iven time
during 19 58, 90 per cent of the items weighed 100 pounds or l ess, and
99 per cent weighed be l ow 500 pound s . 1 3

This should mean also that

99 per cent of the airlift could be carried in present MATS or CRAF
aircraft because the doors would permit entry to any item weighing l ess
than 500 pounds .

S ize of the cargo would not be a problem in 99 per

cent of the cargo .
As a result of the Rand Corporation study it can be concluded
that the use of airlift re duces the weight of a shipment by 35 per cent
from what it would be by surface transportation.

The United S tates

Government is paying 35 per cent above the actual weight of the shipment.
Air lift of P ersonnel . --A s the use of airlift has reduced the total
requirement for spare parts and equipment because of the re d uction in
the intransit time, so has the air l ift of personnel to overseas areas re duced the total re quirement for personnel.

Ai rlift , because of its spee d,

is proving to be the most de s i red m ethod of shipment of personnel to
overseas d estinations .

This do es not m ean that the handling or proces-

1 3 11 U. S.A. F. Mulls D ouglas Cargo Study,

p. 43 .

11

Airlift, November 1 96 0 ,
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sing of passengers is mo re efficient by air shipment than by rail or
surface shipme n t.

When the maintenance of a particu lar size force

is necessary, it can be accomplished by airlift with much fewer per sonnel.

Through the use of airlift, the en route time of each individual

shipping to an over se as point is reduce d from sixteen da ys to two days.
The d ifference in travel time emphasiz es the advantage of airlift and
is illustrated in an excerpt from

~irlift

magazine:

It has been estimate d that in fiscal 1959, MATS will transport
325, 000 Air Forc e personnel with a saving of 14 da ys of travel
per person flown. This means in effect that it has 12, 63 0 additional personne l in productive employment. It also means that
it has been able to close two primary personnel centers, making
available an additional 1, 35 0 peopl e for use in other Air Force
jobs. These savings are equivalent, accordi ng to Gen. Tunner,
t o t he authorize d personnel for three heavy bomber wings. 14
In fiscal year 196 3, a ccor ding to the A ir Force Times in a January 19 64 issue, MATS and CRAF airlifted a total of 1, 300,000 personnel to overseas destinations or return to the U.S.A.

It is assumed

that at l east 400, 000 were Arm y personnel because of the increase in
the number of special exercises conducted in fiscal year 196 3.

Con-

sidering the reduction of the intra.nsit time from sixteen days to two
days, if 400, 000 were airlifted it would be a saving of 5, 600, 000 manda y s (400 , 000 personnel x 14 da ys ).

D ivide 365 da ys into 5, 600,000

man-days and it e quals 15, 342 personnel save d by the use of a irlift.
This is in excess of an a r m y division.

Not only would there be the sav-

in g of the personne l but the expenditure for trucks, t a nks , artillery,
guns , buildings, and supplies would be saved .

1411 MATS New St rategy: S e ll Airlift, 11 Airlift, May 19 59, pp . 36 - 38.
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How much the Army cou ld be reduced in total strength as a
result of the use of airlift is unknown because one does not know what
the Army will be committed to perform.

Therefore, no attempt wi ll

be made to establish a numerical figure for a reduction .

If the Army

uses airlift exclusively and ships 8 00, 000 personne l , approximately
31, 000 personnel would be saved, or the Arm y could reduce its force
b y 3 1, 000 personnel.
A precedent has been establish ed by Great Britain in reducing
the size of its ground forces.

Great Britain has followed a policy since

1957 of airlifting its forces to troubl esome areas, both b y military aircraft and commercial aircraft.

From the following article it is readily

seen that air lift is necessary for Great Britain's ground forces:
When Great Britain asked the Unite d States and its other North
Atlantic Treaty allies to consider stationing peacemaking troops on
the island of Cyprus, it onl y served to i ll ustrate that Britain's military committments have not decreased commensurate l y with her
divo r cement from colonial responsibilities.
With an army of only 170, 000 men, p l us 15, 000 Gurkha troops,
Britain has soldiers stationed all over the globe. S ome 400 British
commandos landed at D ar es S alaam, Tanganyika, on January 25 to
que ll a new outburst of mutiny . S ome 6, 000 British troops are patrolling Cyprus, and another 2, 000 are stationed on Malaysia ' s
borders with S arawak and Sabah (No rth Borneo). Rebe l Tribesmen
in the So uth Arabian Fed eration pin down 5, 000- m en in the Aden
garrison .
The contigent in British Guiana is being halve d to about 75 0 .
O ther Commitments includ e garr i sons of 70 0 men in Gibraltar,
about 5, 5 00 in Hong K ong, 6, 000 in Kenya, 1 , 500 in Libya, 3 , 000
in Malaya , and 60 0 in S wazil and. There are 53 , 000 British troops
in the Rhine Arm y, and 1 , 000 in West Ber l in . (W est Germany and
the United S tates are the onl ;· NA T O countries fHrni shing their full
commitment of troops in the fi e ld. ) The United King dom itself is
garrisoned by abo llt 80, 000 men. 15 .

15 "Thin Line of Heroes," El Pa so Times, February 8, 1 964, p. 4-A.
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The above procedure of airlift ing troops to vital areas after trouble
arises has proved effe ctive for Great Britain .

The United S tates has fol-

lowed a po lic y of maintaining a large force of troops in Europe and the Pacific area since W orld War II.

However, S ecretary of D efense Rob ert

McNamara and Sec retary of S t ate D ean Rusk have told the NAT O countries
that the U nite d States intend s to d ecrease the Arm y units in Germany.
S ecreta ry McNamara stated that the d ecrease would save NATO contributions for maintaining this l arge fo rce in the field with no loss in the ability
to withstand any a ggression . 1 6 Airlift, according to S ecretary McNamara,
cou ld put the forces into position in plenty a£ time.

This rr,obility would

permit a reduction in the size of the total army units . 17
A precedent has alread y been establishe d by the Royal Air For ce
fo r t h e use of airlift in this manner.
It would be an undesirabl e extravagance, however, to
attempt to maintain large balanced forces in each theatre
sufficient to undertake limited-war operations. Furth er more, in the rapidl y changing pattern of world events it is
quite impossib l e to forecast with any degree of accuracy where
or when trouble may arise.
This has led to the concept of a central strategic reserve of
troops with the ability to deplo y rapidly to any part of the world.
S uch mobility calls for air transport and for this purpose Transport
Command in the Unit e d Kingdom is being built up . 18
The words of Wing Commander C. W. Hayes, Royal Air Forc e , in
1959 l end credibility to the policy of airlifting troops to trouble areas while

l 6 11 P eriscope,

11

Newsweek, May 8, 1 964, p. 16 .

17 Ibid. , p. 16.
l 8 11 The Operationa l P osture of the Royal Air Forc e, 1 959, 11
Air University Quart er l y R eview, Montgomery, Ala., Summ er 1 959.

20

maintaining fewer personnel i n service,

Th e extens iv e use of airlift

permits sizable re ductions i n t otal arm y strength, and its use should b e
applie d in the fo llowing manner:
1.

Normal rotation of ind ividual s to and from overse as.

2,

Rotation or p l acem ent of complete army uni ts.

3.

Special exercises to insure the e ffi ciency of both MAT S and
the army units.

Though the use of air l ift to move personnel of the Arm y would p er mit greater reductions in A r m y strength than it woul d for the A ir Fo rce
or Navy because of the l arger numb er of Arm y personnel being moved,
air lift would rend er savings to the Air Force and Navy in proportion to
the nu m ber of personnel airlifted,
Summary . --Airlift has economic advantages because of its speed,
long range, and packag ing re q uirements over surface transportation ..

It

was used as a basis for closin g dow n five lar ge ov erseas depots , which re sulte d in estim a ted savings as follows :
(1)

P ers onn e l strength d ecrease d by 40, 000

(2f

S a ving of O peration and M aintenance funds

$200,000,000

from closin g of fi ve A ir Force depots

5 0 ,000 , 000

( 3)

S torage space saved at $2 . 25 per squa re foot
($2 . 25 x 10 , 0 00, 00 0 square feet )

22 , 5 0 0, 0 00

O ther savings f rom th e use of air lift by the A ir Force are:
( 1)

(2)
{3)

Reduction of intransit time from 1 6 to 2 days
(1 3, 98 0 p ers onne l x $5,000 annual salary)

69,900,000

Reduction of inventor y levels ( spares ) by one third (Appendix B )

444,000 , 000

Initia(Investment decrease on air craft engines

4 0 3,200,000
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This is an estimated savin g of $1,1 89.6 million that the Ai r
Force has realized through the use of air lift.
The Army and Navy will be able to effect comparab l e savings
in som e of the same areas as the Air Fo rce, such as
(1)

( 2)

Re d uction of 3 1,000 personnel (16 days to 2
days ) ( 3 1 , 000 x $ 5, 000 annual salary)
Reduction of inventory levels (spares )

$ 155,000,000
444,000,000
$599 , 000 ,000

Plus
(1)

Storage space reductions.

(2 )

Closing of some suppl y depots.

Sufficient air lift will be available for all branches of the military
services and total savings of approximate l y 2 billion dollars should be
attained if extensive use of airlift is made.

22

CHAP T ER IV
P R OCUREMENT AND MANUFACTURING ASPECTS
P rocurement. --Stability in the pro cure m ent of aircraft h as certain
econom ic a d vantages in that " f east o r famine " cond itions could be elimi nated, thereby reducing the ~nit cost of the p~oduct .

It would provide

stead y e m p loyment , e liminating excess capacity and probab l y night- shift
operations that increase the cost of the produ ct.
the pr esent conditions.

However , these are not

Th e A ir Fo rce has always ha d the probl e m of

securi ng enough new a d vance d aircraft for a ll its major commands.

In

this eff ort to pro vid e adequate aircraft the Air F orce h a s fo llowed a po licy in its procurem ent that a "planning body" determ ine d w hat the aircraft sho uld be ab l e to accomp.li sh .

Ai rcraft. manufacturers then s ub -

mitte d d esigns and the A ir Fo rce se l ecte d the one desi gn it f e lt coul d
best accompli sh the objectives .

Of course , there were certain limita -

tions , such as the price per aircraft, etc .
S ince W or ld W ar I much has d e p end e d on the political and econom ical con ditions pre v ailing at the time rather than on the tru e needs for
the d evel opment and per fo rmance of an airc raft.

F or instan ce, appro -

priations for new aircraft were not generally made when the economy was
d epresse d.

It has always been easier t o get funds fo r new aircraft when

the econom y was boomin g .

Fo r example , the D epartment o f D efense in

1948 had e stallishe d the nee d for a 70 W ing Air For ce minimum.l

lP oyntz Tyler, A irways of Am erica (New York: H. W. Wil son C o.,
1 958 ) , p . 3 1.
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Du r ing th e recession of 1949 and early 1950 Secretar y of Defense
Louis Johnson decreased the Air Force to a 43 W in g level.

How ever,

this r e cession ar y period would have b een an excellent time to award
n ew c ontracts for aircraft as a stimulus to the economy.
This dependence on "good

times~'

th e aircraft ma n ufacturer, created a

11

for the Air Force, and also

feast or famine 11 conditi on .

These conditions are generally a result of uncertainty in the federal
budg et, which l eads to uncertainty in procurement for those companies
that rel y primarily on government contracts .
Pr e s i d ent

o{

Donald Douglas, Sr.,

Douglas Aitc:caft Company, explained the condition whe n

h e stated that he received a telegram on V -J da y cancelling every cont ract the company had.

Douglas said that he had 90 thousand p e ople em-

plo y ed at that point and it was necessary to lay them all off. 2 This c e rtain ly is n ot the onl y problem that the manufacturer must face; however,
it is one that has constantl y plagued him.
Manufacturing Aspects. --It should be recognized at this point that
an aircraft manufacturing company, to some degree, is a quasi-publi c
utility.

The company makes its profit, or los s, primarily on government

contracts and therefore must operate withing certain governmental restrictions.

If its profits on government contracts exceed 7 per cent, it must

refund to the government all profits in excess of this percentage. 3

2Ibid., p. 30.
3F r anklin G. Moore, Manufacturing Management (Hom ewood, Ill.:
Ri c hard D . Irwin, Inc., 196 1}, p. 719.
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Aircraft manufacturing requires large plant, e quipment, and
capital outlays; consequently, the number of manufacturers within
the indust ry is kept small.

Competition within the in dustry is keen

becuase one contract can keep the production lines rolling from four
to five years.

The controversy that a rose in 19 63 over the award of

the TFX all- service interceptor plane contract resu lt ed in the resigna tion of S ecretary of Navy F red Ko rth.
Consequently, this competition among the aircraft manufacturers
affects the "breakeven point . "

Normally, a manufacturer producing

a new aircraft does not begin to "breakeven" for two or three years .
Suppose the "breakeven" point is determined to be the fiftieth aircraft
produced and sold.

The manufacturer will naturally accelerate production

in order to get as much of the market as possible before the competition
can catch up, thereby reaching the " breakeven" point quickly.
celerated production method leads to excess capacity.

This ac-

Lar ge numbers

of workers are hired in the beginning to increase production; competitors
produce a sim ilar aircraft or one possibly a litt l e superior in its performance, and as orders dec rease workers are laid off.
The Air Fo rce contributes to this same production cyc l e in another
manner.

As performance of new aircraft normally excee ds that of older

aircraft being replaced, the Air For ce undertakes accelerating the produ ction of new aircraft to get them into operation.

When enough new air-

craft are operating, d emand de creases , and this adds to the flu ctuating
production cyc l es prevalent in the aircraft industry.

25

It is possible th a t the "feast and fam ine " cycles that prevent the
manufact ure r's fu ll uti lizat iOn of his economiC res ourc es may never be
so l ve d.

However , it is entirely possible to l eve l out the flu ctu ations by

stabilizing the pr o duction cycle.
Som e Aspects of Airc raft Replacement. --The end of the Korean
Wa r initiated a l ar g e scal e re placement program to equip the Air Forc e
with more advanced aircraft; the program took advantage of new developm ents in technology and retired some World War II aircraft that were obsolete.

The Kor ean War awakened the Unite d S t ates to the a dvancements

made by Soviet Ru s sia in air power since the end of World War II.

It was

an opportunit y to test the l atest jet propulsion fighter aircraft that the
United States had in production.

The Korean War opened the jet propul-

sian era and made evi de nt the feas ibility of jet propulsion for use with all
t y pes of a ircraft.
As a resu lt of lessons l earne d in the Ko re an War, the prevalent

str ategic viewpoint was that if a war were to occur it would be a general
all-Out war, and the S trategic Air Command (SAC) would deliv er the knockout b low with its fast jet bombers .

Conseque~tly, - there were no funds

avail ab le to modernize MATS 1 airlift capability to keep pace with the strategic force as Air Force funds were needed to modernize th e St rategic,
Ta c tical, and Air Defense Commands.

MATS, which had the responsibility

of airlifting SAC personnel and equipment to overseas areas, became badly
obsolete in a period when the Air Force's offensive and defensive arms
were rapidl y converting to an all-jet propulsion force. 4 The reason given
by Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan F. Twining for not modernizing MATS

4u.

S. Congress, Senate, S tudy of the Militar y Air Transport Ser vice ,
85th Gong., 2nd S ess. , 1958, p . 132.
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was pure l y a budg etar y one,

There wer e n ot sufficien t funds available

and t he offensive and defensive aircraft m u st come first, 5
Afte r seve ral spec ial exercises , s uch as "Big Slam," in which
MATS and the commercial carriers airlifted units of the Army or
Strate gic Air Command to overs eas areas, it became evident that the
airlift c apability of the United Stat es must be modernized to k eep pa ce
with rapidly changing world conditions,

General Max well Taylor had

lon g ar gue d that limite d warfare was more of a probability than a gener al
a ll- out war .

When G ener al Taylor was m a de Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff in 1961 the emphasis shifted to being better prepared to combat a
limited wa r situation.

6

Congress, as explained in Chapter I, provided

nece ssary fu n ds in 1960 to be gi n an interim modernization program tha t
would give MATS the capabilit y of supporting the Army and its limited war
re quir e ments,
On e of the means that MATS could use to be prepared to provid e this
support is through the annual budget,

If funds w ere made available on an

a nnual basis, the pur chase of repl acement aircraft on the same basi s would
be possible.

In this way, each year a part of the airlift fleet would have

the latest techno lo gical improvements added ,

This do es not m e an that a

totally differ ent type of aircraft would be procure d each year but that an
improved series of a model current l y in use would be procured,

Fo r ex-

ampl e , the series of the Boeing 707/C-135 now in production has the turbofan engine s which are more efficient and have a highe r performance than the

5
u. S, Congress, S enate, St ud y of th e Militar y Air Transport Service,
85th Gong., 2nd Se ss ,, 1958, p. 1 33 ,

~eport of S pecial S ubcommittee on National Militar y Airlift of the
Committee on Armed S ervices, Hous e of R e presentatives, 85th Gong .,
2n d S e ss.
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earlier engine mode l. 7 It is assumed that, unl ess a major breakthrough
in technology is made, such as an e ffici ent rocket engine a d apted for aircraft use , a m odern airlift fl eet c a n be maintain e d by improving the model currently in production.

A good ru l e of thunb to use for repl acing

the type of aircraft in use is to use the depreciation period.

If the air -

craft are depreciated over an eight - ye a r period the aircraft t ype should
be replac e d at the end of this period .
Us e of the above proce d ure in purchasing would permit the manufacturer to l eve l out the flu ctuations in his production cycle .

Attainin g

this stability in the manufacturing process shou ld result in pro d uction
of a ircraft at a l ower unit cost by utilizing the standard 40 hour work
week.

As the work week is increase d the unit cost sta rts inc reasing .

If the manufacturer has to acce l erate production, his costs will be affected in this way , accor d ing to D r . Franklin E. Mo ore:
Fo r several reasons first - shift (day -shift)
production costs l ess thru1 second-shift (night-.shift)
production. The night-shift has more new men than the
day - shif t and both ab sentee ism and turnover (men quitting ) are higher . Also, night men do too muc-h du ring
the da ytim e and come to work tired . All of this cuts
effic i ency and boosts c osts.
Ni ght-shift work is likel y to b e onl y 8 0 to 90 per
cent as e ffi c i ent as day - shift work. Som etimes this do esn ' t
show in the recor d s , however, b ecause troub l esom e jobs a re
a ll done on t he first shift . Nigh t men chiefly get easy job s and
long r uns.
Night men a re also pai d a shift differential, an extra wa ge
over day m en amoun ting to about 5 per cent. Add together lower o utput a n d higher wages an d y ou will find that prod ucts made

7 Personal l etter from Robert W. Smart.
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at n i ght are lik ely to cost 20 per cent more than
products made on the da y-s h ift . 8
Therefore, the desirable method of pro duc tion to achieve the
low est unit cost is that of a straight da y - shift operation .
S ummary. --The progress of military airlift has been rapid in
recent years when one takes into account aircraft perfor mance.

It

h as not been quite so rapid fro m an organizational or procedural aspect.

However, the commercial carriers ' sha re of the airlift h a s

been increasing since 19 59, and MATS has been inching closer to i ts
true ro l e of providing airlift for special military exercises .

MATS

can maintain a modern fl eet of ai rc1·aft with flexibilit y io meet

all}'

emergencies if a systematic, planne d proc urement program is followed.

S uch a pro gram would, a l so , at the same time allow the

m anufa cturer to stabilize his production so that the unit costs c ould
be held to a minim um.

This wo uld be advantageous to both MATS

and the manufa ct ur ers .

8F ranklin E. Moore, Manufactur ing Man a gement (Hom ewoo d, Ill.:
Richar dD. I rwin, Inc., 196 1), p. 110.

29

CHAP T E R V
A IR LIF T RE Q UIREMENTS
S ize of A irlift Force . --The size of the airlift force should onl y
be lar ge enough to air l ift 1 , 200, 000 passengers and 230, 0 0 0 tons of
cargo annually as shown in Appendix D , Table I V, plus those aircraft necessary to perform the hard-core mission .

CRAF should have

an airlift force large enough to handle the routine air l ift function, while
MATS ' size shoul d be adequate to perform its har d -core mission.

To

perform the above missions CRAF should be equipped with 78 jet trans port aircraft and MA T S with 7 0 jet transport a i rcraft.

With such are-

duction i n the size of the air li ft force there will be comparable reductions in the flight and ground support personne l .
To determine the size of the airlift force necessary, some assump tions first were necessary because data on the hard-core mission is li mited for security reasons .

F irst, in the event of a general war the re -

quirements for air l ift will not be as great as in previous years.

This is

because of the increase d range of the B - 52, an eight - jet engine bomber
capabl e of bombing any world - wide targets and ret u rning to its home
base.

S taging bases are no l onger neede d for the B -52; conse q uently,

no support re q uirement is neede d of MAT S .

S econdl y, the pr i mary

requirement wi ll be for air lift of A rmy units in a limited war situation.
Thirdly, the Tactical Air Command will be l argely self-supporting with
the activation of additional C -1 30E s q uadrons.

Und er these assumptions,
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it is probable that much of the continuous airlift requirement over the
first few da y s in a limited war situation will be the airlift of personnel.
Considering the above assumptions, which should re duc e the total
hard-core airlift re qui rement from what it has been in the past, it appears that Secretary of D efense McNamara has to face the prospect of
increasing airlift costs.

The following statement is i llustr a tive of the

problem;
P entagon --D e fe nse S ecretary McNamara's plan to build up U.S.
airlift capability faces one big obstacle--the price. To fly a
division(about 14, 000 men and 28, 00 0 tons of equipment)
ov e rseas with the transport p lanes now on h a nd takes almost
a month . McNa.mara wants to be read y to move two divisions
on a week's n otice, but the extra jets (plu s upkeep for a year )
would cost $3.5 billion. 1
The cost referred to by Secretary McNamara is one reason why
CRAF should be given the responsibility for airlifting the majority of
th e routine airlift.

This would permit MATS, with its 70 aircraft, to

engage in the special exercises with the Army and Marines, and handling
the nuclear weapons that must be airlifted.
The airlift of nuclear weapons is a critical area which MATS must
handle.

P resent laws controlling nuclear mat eria l prohibit the commer -

cial carriers from participating in this airlift responsibility.

MATS'

capabi lity, with its 70 aircraft , would be adequate to perform this mission.

In the following breakdown, the capabilities of MATS and CRAF,
after their mod ernization, will be shown for the purpose of illustrating
what the total capability will be compared to the projected annual require -

1

"Th e Periscope," Newsweek, June 25, 1962, p . 14.
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ment.

The statistics use d are an average based on four different type

aircraft, C-141( 1 32 ) , C-135(30), C-130E( 50), a nd the C-l33B(50) .
The figures in p;,.rentheses a~e the total number of that partic~la; type
of aircraft that MATS will possess.

The original standards were extr acted

from a do cument "S trategic Airlift C-141 S tarlifter " provided the author by
Lockheed Ai rcraft Company.
MATS Capability (272 Aircraft)
Load Capacity equals personnel or 30 tons of cargo
Daily Utilization equals 8 fl ying hours per aircraft
Monthl y Utilization equal s 240 flying hours per aircraft
Monthly flying hours for 272 aircraft equal 65, 280 fl ying hours
CRAF Capab1lity (280 Aircraft)
240 flying hours per m onth per aircr aft e q uals 67,200 flying hours
This monthly flying hour capability of 65, 280 hours for MATS and
67,2 00 hours for CRAF gives a combines monthly flying hour capability
of 132,480 hours.

This would be 116 ,0 16 flying hours in excess of the

peacetime projected requirement , or 479 excess aircraft .

Beginning

with the projected annual peacetime airlift re qui rement of 1, 200, 000
passengers and 230 , 000 tons of cargo, from Appendix D, Table IV, it
is broken down to a monthly basis; 100 ,000 passengers and 1 9, 1 67 tons
of cargo would have to be air lifte d.

If the trips are d ivided e qually be-

tween the Atlantic and P acific theaters of operation, the airlift would
requir e 1 6,464 flying hours, as shown in A ppendix E , Tabl e V, or 70
a irc raft .

In considering the air l ift re q uirements it would not be possibl e

to achieve 100 per cent load capacity on each fli ght because of numerous
factors such as the la ck of cargo or passengers availabl e for the scheduled
day of departure.

Therefore, for the pur p ose of this a n alysis, the average
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load capacity has been established at 80 per cent,

Add 20 per cent to

the monthly requirement of 16, 464 fl y ing hours and a monthly flyin g
hour re qni re ment of 18, 757 hoLJrs is established.
air craft ( 1 6, 464

~

This is equal to 78

240).

With such a surplus of airlift capability that will be available in
1965 with the deliver y of the C-141, 2 the airlift fleet should be decreased
to the size its requirements call for, with an allowance made for unforeseen requirements, lo sses due to accidents, etc.

The aircraft to be main-

tained b y CRAF and MATS should be the most modern , the C-141, and the
surplus should be disposed of.

MATS has on order 132 of the C-141 1 s comp-

are d t o its rcquireme:1t for 70.

Th<: last 62 on the crder should be ca:1-

celled or l ease d to CRAF members.

The other types of aircraft possessed

by MATS should be transferred to other major commands in the Air Force
or l e ased to CRAF memb ers to the extent they would improve the CRAF
with more modern aircraft.

With CRAF providing the majority of the

rou tine airlift, MATS aircraft would be released for the special exercises and the hard-core mission.

As with MATS, CRAF will probably have a surplus of aircraft.

If CRAF modernized its fle et along with MATS, it would have a surplus
of approximate l y 202 aircraft based on military airlift requirements.
This would necessitate CRAF disposing of its least economical aircraft
or finding new sources of airlift.

2 Lockheed-Georgia Co,, S trategic Airlift C-141 Star lifte r, Marietta,
Geo rg ia, 196 3, p. 22.
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Howev er, there is a qu estion t h a t s h o uld be answered at this
point .

The disposal of surplus aircraft b f MAT S would i n clude the

C-133B which handles the outsize cargo .

This disposal would create

no problem as the C-141 , with some minor modifications, is capabl e
of moving the "Minuteman" missile.

The Minuteman-loaded SSCBM

( shipping and Storage Cont.ainer Ballistic Missile ) rolls straight in at
truckbed height from its special trailer.

The pressurized and air

condition e d cargo compartment affords maximum environmental protection to sensitive c omponents.

The C-1 4 1 can also haul one or more

of a ll mode ls of strategic or tactical missiles that require overseas d e ployment. 3 The capability of the C-141 not only reduces the numb er of
aircraft require d for the airlift mission but it has other concurrent eco nomic advan ta g es as well .
Air craft Crew Requirements.--Th e crew requirements of CRAF and
MATS will be reduced because of the fewer number of aircraft required
to perform the airlift mission.

MATS, in the past, has operated on a basis

of two flight crews for each aircraft assigned in its manning policy. 4
MATS, with a requirement of 70 aircraft versus 272 assigne d, woul d need
140 flight crews for the 70 aircraft and 544 flight crews for 272 aircraft .
MATS would have a surplus of 404 flight crews that could be transferred
to other Air Force units.

If the same criteria of two flight crews per

aircraft is used for CRAF, there wou l d be a surpl us o f 4 1 0 crews from the

3L ockheed-Georgia Co., Strategic Airlift C- 141 Starlifter, Marietta,
Georgia, 1 963, p. 15.
4Stanley H. Brewer and Roger B. Ulvestad, The Cargo-Jet In
Military Air Transportation, Renton, Wash., 1 960, p. 55 .
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militar y a ir lift if CRAF re d uce d their number t o 78 .
There i s n o indication that MATS or CRAF would retai n all of
the personnel they now h a v e i f their aircraft w a -s re d uce d to what the
a ir lift mission requires .

As new aircraft are r eceived that can do

three or fou r times the work of their pre d ecess ors, it is on l y natural
to c ut down the n umb er of aircraft, fl i ght crews , and gr oun d support
personne l if full economi c advantage i s to be gaine d.
Ground S upport P ers onnel . --It h a s been said that i t is always
the gr ound support persormel tha t make a system work in th e militar y
service .

Cons e qu entl y , this is tru e i n MATS , and especially so in

the air lift busi'less .

MA.T S h a s supported the ai:::Eft mission on a

basis of 5 .12 ground support per sonne l to one fli ght crew m e mber.
This fi g ure was derived from the fo llowing:
P ers o rmel
M~~s
D irect E xpense F unctions :
Cr ews
Fi e ld an d O rganizational Maintenance

5, 767
8,938

Indirect E xpense Functions:
Admin istration
Groun d Maintena nce
Ground Op er a tions
Squadron O verhead
T raffi c

3 ,047
4,384
2,558
419
_2_,766
14, 17 4
Headquar ters MAT S overhead an d independent
Unit supp o rt
6 17
Total Man -Y e a rs e mplo ye d in the Strategic
T ransport Mi ssion

29, 55 15

5u. s. C ongress, S enate, S tudy of M ilitary Air Trafl sport S e rvi ce,
85th Gong ., 2nd S ess ., 1 958 .
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If MATS aircraft assignment strength was he ld at 272 with a
crew assignment of 544 the ground support personnel re quire d would
be 16 , 712 ( 3, 264 crew members multiplied by 5 .12} compared to 4, 30 1

(840 x 5. 1Z} if the aircraft assignment was limited to 70.

If the ratio of

ground support personnel to 1 flight crew member is increased to 8 to 1
from 5 . 12 to 1 because of the increased compl exity of e quipment, then
the ground support personnel would be increased to 26,112 for 272 air craft .

For 70 aircraft assigne d at a ratio of 8 to 1 it would require

6, 720 (840 crew members multiplied by 8} ground support personnel.
Therefore a saving of 19,392 personnel would be gaine d when MATS was
limited to 70 aircraft.
It should be pointed out that CRAF m e mbers would not re q uire the
same ratio of ground support personnel to fli ght crew personnel because
MATS p rovi des CRAF membe rs traffic and operations clearing services.
Summar y .--The annual airlift requirements require an airlift force
of 78 aircraft for CRAF and 70 aircraft for MATS.

CRAF will have a force

of 280 aircraft and MATS will have a force of 272 aircraft.

This force is

far in excess of that required and should be cut back to that required prior
to getting the lar ger number on hand from the manufa cturer .
CRAF should handle the majority of the projected requirement of

1, ZOO, 000 passengers and 230,000 tons of cargo.

MATS would airlift

special cargo of a critical nature and conduct special exercises in preparation fo r its wartin1e mission.

In addition to the economic advantages modern type aircraft give to
airlift by re ducin g the number of aircraft re quired it provides for savings
in the number of flight crews required for CRAF and MATS.

This has con-

current econom ic g ains in that the number of ground support personnel required for MATS will be reduced from 26 , 112 personne l to 6, 720 personne l ,
more than enough to completely man a B-52 wing .
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CHAPTER VI
INTEGRATED S YSTEM OF AIRLIFT
Integration of Airlift.--An integrate d system, which utilizes
MATS and CRAF, appears to be a lo gical step in the deve lopm ent of an
airlift policy.

W e l earned in World War II and the Kor ean War that

CRAF must be relied on heavil y for airlift support.

At the beginning of

both wars, commercial planes and crews were pressed into military airlift service.

In the Ko .cean War tl1e coinlnercial caTriers were flyin g

their first trips within 24 hours after being called. 1 If CRAF is to be relied upon in a n e me rgency, however, it must be given enough airlift to maintain a modern fl eet of ai rcraft .

Mr. Robert W. Pres cott , President of

Flying Tiger Lin es, Inc., expressed the need this way:
To provide the new, heavy-duty, low-cost aircraft essential
to the defense plans of the country and to provide new lar ge
car g o aircraft with the l ow ton-mile direct fl ying costs requir e d to expand and serve the airfreight needs of the country , the civilian carriers must acquire fleets of new, lar ger,
faster, and more highly powered aircraft which the manufacturers
can and will supply when orders justify. 2
Therefore, CRAF should be given the bulk of the routine airlift in
peacetime so it will be. prepared to carry out its assigned mission in wartime.

Not onl y should this be done for strategic reasons but also for eco -

1 u. s. Con gress, S enate, S tud y of Military Ai r Transport S ervice ,
85th Gong., 2nd S ess., 1958, p . 53 .
2Ibid., p. 58.
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nomic ones, as the cost of an integrated s y s t em, comprised of mode rn
aircraft, is be l ow t he cost of a purely military airlift fo rce ( see Table IV,
A ppendix D).
There is some opposition, however, to placing too much re lian ce on
CRAF in emergencies.

To better understand the pro and con positions, an

exp lan ation of CRAF is appropriate.
Civil Reserve Air Fleet.--CRAF is a fleet of aircraft, owned b y
various commer cial carriers, which have been desi gnated to be available
within a 48 hour period to perform an assi gne d militar y mission in the event of a n ational emergency.

Under the CRAF plan, the participating

members nave a certain number of trips to perform.

The CRAF airc raft

h ave additional e quipment installed to make them read y for military use.
The CRAF fl eet is reviewed annually by representatives of the commercial carriers that ar e members of CRAF, MATS, and the D epartment of

-

-

Comm erce to bring the fl eet up to a current status by adding late model
type aircraft and eliminating the obsolete types. 3
There are many problems in the CRAF program that still remain,
although they should have been resolved many years ago.

Opposition to

the program by the members of CRAF is centered on the following points
as compi led by the Reed Committee 4 -and given in summary form.

l.

There is n o incentive to be a member of CRAF. The members
feel, and with justification, that as lon g as th~y are to provide

3 " What is T h e Civil Reserve Air Fle et ," MAT S Public Information
O ffice R e leas e (S cott AFB, Illinois).
4A Committee , appointed b y P resid ent E isenhower, of prominent
businessmen to study the airlift dispute between MATS and the commer cial c a rr ie rs .
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airlift during a n ation al e m ergency they should ge t special
c onsiderat ion on airlift procurement during peaceti me opera tions .

z.

The D epa rtment of D efense should have the authority to acti v ate CRAF in any type of e m ergen c y situation. The CRAF
members -fe e l that CRAF should be activated only i n an all-out
or general wa r s ituation: .

The S ec r e ta ry of D efense cannot ac-

tivate CRAF in a limit e d- war situation such as the Viet-Nam
struggl e .

Th e CRAF members fee l that if they were acti v ate d

in a limited-war s ituat ion, a n d thus prevented from bidding on
new contr a cts as a resu l t of h a ving their aircraft tied up, they
would lo se their com petitive pos ition for future airlift business.
3.

CRAF members must exec ute a contract which would obligate
them -to p e rform. The members fee l that they respond e d d ependabl y in World War II and the K orean War and that this re qui re m ent i mpu gns their \ oyalty.

But the position of the government

in reference to the CRAF progr am a s state d b y the R ee d Committe e is:
a.

The responsiveness of CRAF is inadequate.

Military

l ea d ers f ee l tha t the ability ~f CRAF memb ers to res pond within a 48 hour period is extr e mely doubtf ul.
b.

Stat utor y l egis lation is necessary to enfo rce the execution
of the contract.

Whil e the governm e nt do es not qu estion the

patriotism of any individual, the security of the nat ion is at
stake and any unnecessary risk i s too m uch .
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It was explaine d this way by Robert W. Smart, Chief Counsel of
the House Armed S ervices Committe e :

It is pertinent to note that the respons iveness of CRAF is
based entire l y on a civil contr act. Without impugning the
patriotism of the crews of the civil aircraft, militar y
l eaders obvious l y have serious reservations about the reliability of this type of responsiveness . The enactm ent of
l egislation would be required to improve this situ ation and
the subject is currently under consideration, with a view
of developing a l egis lati ve proposal. 5
L egislation has not been enacted at this time.

Howev er, it is

still under consideration, and the general conclusions of the House
Armed Services Committee which met in 1960 6 are listed below:
1.

That c onsideration be given to extending the authority
of the P resident to activate CRAF in national emergencies
short of general war.

2.

That commercial airlines be required to execute agreements
with their e mplo yees, or empl oyee representatives, that will
insure no work stoppages in the event their efforts are required,
as determine d by th e P resident, to support a nationa l military
re quirement.

3.

That the D epartment of the Air Force proceed with the development of a -program which wou ld insure both an adequate an d an
equitabl e participation of the members in CRAF to meet the contingency of partial mobilization.

4.

That, to the extent of the congressional set-a- side in annual
appropriation bills, the procurement of civil au gmentation

5Robert W. Smart, Chief Counsel, Committee on Armed S ervices,
House of Repr esentatives , P ersonal letter (July 10, 1961).
6Report of Special Subcommittee on National Militar y Airlift of the
Committee on Armed Services, H ouse of Rep resentative s, 85th Gon g . ,
2nd S ess .
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airlift be initially restricted to the participants of CRAF,
The differences that exist between government officials and
CRAF members must be reso l ve d to provide the United S tates the
greatest security.

The nation ' s total airlift resources must be as-

sessed and the most effective and economical us e planned for these
resources.

A Comparison of Airlift S ystems, --A comparison of the total
costs of airlift systems wi ll ai d in determining the type of airlift struc ture that would be most efficient for the United S tates.

To arrive at a

proposed po li cy or method of operation, the cost data in Table IV was
compile d using the fl y ing hour requirements from Chapter Ill.

In this

compi l ation, it was necessary to assum e certain common denominators such as

(1) Average ann ual sal ary of $5,000 per person.
(2) Air Transport A ssociation (ATA) estimated cost per flying hour
for the jet transport aircr a ft --$i , 025. 107
( 3)

MATS estimated cost per flyin g hour for the jet transport aircraft
- - $ 852 . 45.

Moreover, a unique feature of the jet transport, or any jet-propelled
aircraft , is that one can predict with ext reme acc uracy the perfor mance of
the aircraft under prevailing weight conditions and weather conditions .
This me a ns that no matter whether it is a comm ercial j et or a military one,
the same mode l a i rcraft will give the same pe rfo r mance.

Therefore, as one

7stanley H . Br ewer and Ro ger B. Ulvestad, The Car g o-J et in
Militar y Air Tr a nsportation (R enton, Wa shington : The Boeing Co . ,
1960), p . 28 .
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can see from Table IV , the initial purchase price of the aircraft c aus es
MATS cost to run high.

In consi de ring the economic aspects of airlift

one can see that it could be advantageous to have the commercial c ar riers
perform the routine airlift function because it would result in a saving of
$406 million, which is the cost of purchasing 70 aircraft for MATS.
Naturally, the type of airlift sys tem to be adopte d cannot be d etermined
on an economic basis a lone .

The integrated system, besides being eco-

nomically practical, is desirable for political a n d strate g ic reasons .
Moreover, the cost of maintaining the MATS system of aircraft maintenance~

traffic, aircraft c l earing and cont:t·ol j_s an aPnlJal c ost regard -

less of whether MATS or CRAF airlifts the routine car g o or passengers.
Utilization of the MATS system by CRAF would exercise the system ade quately so there would be no loss of efficiency.
by thettilization of these MATS services.

CRAF costs are reduced

Consequently, these services

that are provided by MATS reduce the contract cost to the government .

Sum mary .-- CRAF shou ld be assigned the bulk of the routine
airlift if it is to be relied on in wartime .

This wou ld permit CRAF

to main a modern, efficient airlift fleet.

There would be economic

advantages to this policy as CRAF could perform this routine airlift
function at an annual cost of $230,7 33,600.
gic reasons that require a MATS fleet also.

However , there are strateIf MATS were given the

routine air lift responsibility the cost would be $670, 33 0, 6 00 p l us approximately that same amount to perform the special exercises and har d-co re
mission, or a total of $1,340, 667~ 200 .

Assigning the routine air lift
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mission to CRAF at a cost of $2 3 0,733, 60 0 and the hard- core mission
to MATS at a cost of $ 67 0, 33 0 ,600 the total cost would be $ 900, 0 64,200,
This is still $440, 603, 000 be l ow the cost of what MATS could perform
the entire air lift function for.
The integrated system of airlift is the most advantageous system
because of the economic, strate g ic, and poli tical reasons ,

Under the

integrat ed system MATS assigned aircraft strength must be held at 70
aircraft,

It is not necessary to place a maximum aircraft strength on

CRAF, although its requirements would be 7 8 a ircraft, b ecause econo mic factors would accomplish this anyway .
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CHAPTER V II
SUMMARY A ND C ONCLUSIONS
T he nation should recognize that air lift is an instrument of na tional poli cy and that its potential sh ould be d eveloped a ggr essiv ely
and e fficiently .

The tdal a ir lift reso ur ces of the n ation mu st be pro-

g r amm ed for, and utilized, to insure the n a tional security within a
framework which is finan c iall y feas ible .
S ena t or A. M. Monron e y (D e mo crat , O k lah oma), one of the
U. S. S enate 's most knowl e d geab l e m embers on ai r lift, s aid this in a
l etter to the author:
I be l ieve that we can only have a d e quate airlift b y deve loping a maximum forc e , both militar y and c ivil. As I share Billy
Mit che ll' s c oncept that a irpower is a n ati onal produ.ct an d not
purel y militar y , I am still convince d that militar y airlift must
b e and that it is not yet organized a long strike force lines a n d
that the routine logistics job s h ou ld be done by civi l carriers
who should be re quir e d to m ee t any s t and ards of e q uipment
and availability which the national interest requires.
I believe that MATS pro c ur e m ent policy should be d esigne d
to stimulate the purchase of suitable c a rg o aircraft by civil carriers
and that c onsid eration s of cost sho u ld b e secondary. W hile the passenger j et transports wou l d be us eable in some cir cumstances for
militar y purposes, they ar e not satisfa ctor y a irc raft for the move m ent of cargo and combat forc es , and reliance on them for this
purpose I b e li eve would b e a great mistake . 1
This c an be accomplished through the us e of the resourc es of both
MATS and the CRAF m e mb ers .

MATS will possess a force of 272

1Hon . A. M. Monr oney, S enator, State of O klahoma, W ashington,
D. C., P ersonal l etter (June 1 6, 1961 ).
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modern aircraft transports when its modernization program is complete.
This force of transports, when combined with the 280 modern transport
aircTaft of the CRAF would, when based on an ei ght -ho ur daily utilization, permit the airlift, in a one-month period, of more than a million
passenge r s or 336, 000 tons of cargo in the Atlantic zone of operation.
Because of greater distances involved in the P acific zone of operation,
the combined capability would be 518,800 passengers, or 155, 65·0 tons
of cargo.

This capability, measured against projected requirements,

is in excess of what is needed and poses theproblem of how to a llocate
and program the resources which are available.

Therefore, it is

necessary that airlift be viewed in its proper perspective. MATS must
be manned and equipped against its wartime mission, and this mission
only.

Airlift of a routine or repetitive nature should be allocated to

CRAF.

In doing this, a stable force of small CRAF members with

modern aircraft would be built up.

With this stable force of air craft,

any requirement for airlift would be assured of d elivery.
To insure the availability of the CRAF when it is nee d ed, it must
be given the mission of air l ifting the routine traffic.

Further, it should

be required to execute contracts with its e mplo yees to insure that the
passengers and cargo will be airlifted.

Although the carriers feel that

this is unnecessar y , the national security must be preserved and not
left to chance .

CRAF responsiveness will not be a matter of concern as

the CRAF would already be fully exercised as a result of the "routine"
airlift.

The MATS system would be available and fully exercised as a

result of servicing MATS and CRAF.
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MATS and CRAF, when used as an integrated team, would provide
the United States with quick reaction airlift that wou ld have the capacity
to perform any requirement that might face it .
One reco mmendation of all committees which have participate d
in discussions about the operation of MATS is that a greater portion
of MATS' peacetime capacity shoul d be employed in special exercises
with the Arm y and other tactical units which MATS would support in
wartime .

MATS' peacetim e hour l y utilization rate sho uld be he ld at

a level which is at l east half of its wartime rate, according to the report of th e Ree d Committee, 2 a special committee comp o se d of disinterested c i vi li;m pe:csonnal, and the RiveTs House of R ep:cesentatives
Sub committee .

If MATS proje cte d aircraft were flown at h alf of their

wartime projecte d utilization, this wou ld take care of the projected
routine air lift and still leave ampl e capability for specia l exercis es .
This is not necessary nor is i t the most econom i c al air lift policy, a s
shown in Table I V, Appendix D.

In addition to increasing the number of special exercises with
the A rmy and other tactical units, increasing use must be made of
air lift to suppl y over seas units with add e d high val ue parts. This
a ir lift would further re du ce the pipe l ine tim e , reduce total inventory,
and thereby re du ce the a mount of stor a ge space re q uire d.

Fu rther,

a substantial incre as e should b e made in the number of personne l to
be airlifted to overseas d estinations , to e ffective l y utili ze the excess
air lift capability .

The i ncrease d use of airlift wo uld then insure econo-

m y in the personnel a nd l ogistics are as.

W hen 1, 20 0 ,000 passengers

2"M odernize MAT S, R eed Group Ur ges, " Journal, Vo l. XCVII, No .
33, (April ! 6, 196 0), p. 1.
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are air l ifted, and their in - transi t time reduced from 1 6 days to 2 da ys ,
it means an economic g ain of 46, 032 personnel to the military services .
However, in addition to explaining what the air l ift capability wou ld
be if MATS retaine d the 27 2 aircraft on order, or received, and if CRAF
retained 280 aircraft, it shou ld be shown tha t the re q uirement is only neces sary for 70 aircraft in MAT S and 78 inCRAF.

CRAF could air l ift, with its

78 aircraft, the routine re q ui rement of 1 , 20 0, 000 pa ssengers and 23 0, 000
tons of c ar go at a cost of $ 230, 733, 600.

However, for strategic reasons

MATS must handle the special exercises and hard- core mi ssion with its
fleet of 70 air cr aft .

MATS, to fl y its 70 aircraft, must be authorized

and manned for 140 flight crews and 6, 720 ground support personne l.

In consi d ering the flight crews and support personnel for CRAF, it must
be assum e d that economic forces would keep CRAF personnel at the
proper leve l.
Therefore, there is a responsibility in the national airlift require ment for MATS and CRAF .

If the y are given their proper roles a healthy

aircraft industry will be a reality an d national sec ur ity can be assure d.
If MATS is over -m anned with aircraft and personne l , an unhealthy
economic condition wi ll result and this sh ould never be a llowe d to h a ppen .

APPENDIXES
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T ABLE I
COMPARATIVE AIRCRAFT PRODUCTIVITY

Type
A ircraft

C-54

Initial Cost
of
Aircraft

$

Max . ~

for Max.
Pay load~

P -ayl oad
for 2000
NM~

(Tons )

Initial Cost P er
Available Ton Mile
P er Hr . (Dollars )
{3000 -NM)

650, 000. 00

1330

7 . 35

C-97C

1, 284, 000. 00

24 10

12 . 50

873 .00

C- 11 8

1, 200, 000. 00

17 3 0

1 3. 90

7 46. 00

C-121C

1, 747,3 00.00

158 0

11. 86

1,529.00

C -I 24C

I , 646, 406 • 00

I 32 0

I 9. 75

1, 108 . 00

C -1 33B

4 , 7 10, 000. 00

2000

45 . 20

1, 2 18 . 00

Car go -Jet

5,8 00 , 000 . 00

2365

53 .00

377 . 00

$

8 12 .00

SOURCES:
I.
2.

Brewer , S tanley H . and Ro ger B . U l vestad, The Car g o-J et
in Military:_Air Transportation, Januar y 196 0.
Planning Research Co rporation, ·An E conomi c Study of S upers o nic Transports, 24 May 1959.
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TABLE II
AIRCRAFT INITIAL AND REPLENISHMENT SPARE PARTS
U.S. AIR F O RCE FISCAL YEARS 1956-1961
(In billions of dollars )

Fiscal Year

Initial S pares

1956

1. 146

o. 304

1.45 0

1957

0. 880

0.500

1. 38 0

1958

0.600

0.680

1.280

1959

0 . 450

0.750

1.200

1960

0.229

o. 855

1.084

1961

0. 116

o. 900

1. 016

SOURCE :

Replenishment
Spa res

Total

"S e l ective Management of Material," USAF Spar es Study
Group, Wright -Patterson AFB, Ohio, R eport No. 10 (1 960).
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T A B LE III
MATS AIRLIF T, INC L UD ING C OM MER CIAL
F IS C AL YE ARS 195 1 THROU GH 196 2.

P assengers

FlSGll

Ca rgo-Tons

Year
Total

Jl.1ili!aLy

c <rrlt1'El:'Chl

Total

M ilitar y

Ccrrrnercial

992,062

433, 652

558,4 10

29 1,936

156,222

135,7 14

196 1

986, 978

578, 30 3

4 08, 675

269, 364

197,364

7 1,817

1960

993,209

564,297

428, 9 12

27 9, 144

2 13,9 0 6

65 , 238

1959

925, 6 0 3

5 45 , 355

37 9, 248

2 01 ,689

169 , 536

32, 153

19 58

889, 93 0

530, 563

359, 367

164, 957

146, 00 9

18,948

1957

939, 307

748 , 8 41

19 0 , 4 66

167, 01 3

194,53 1

17,482

1956

848,845

700,25 0

148,595

165,2 17

15 0 , 125

15, 0 92

1955

625 , 742

6 17 , 100

8,642

123,8 0 8

12 0, 5 17

3, 29 1

1954

488,764

4 40 , 359

48,40 5

85 ,08 2

75, 173

9, 9 0 9

1953

482, 0 54

38 0,886

10 1, 168

7 9, 10 3

59, 10 9

19, 9 94

1952

435, 18 0

32 3, 145

112 , 0 35

7 6, 11 3

52,862

23,25 1

195 1

345, 822

2 16,670

12 9, 152

62,9 18

43,449

19,469

1962

SOURCES:

1.

Twenty- Eighth Report b y the Committee on Government O perations,
Military Air Transportation, Eighty - Fifth C ongress, Second
Session, June 26, 1 958 .

2.

Air l ift Servic e Mana gement Reports, Military Air Transport
Service .

TABLE IV
INITIAL COST DATA FOR ROUTINE AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS
FOR ONE YEAR .

O per a tor

S upport
No. P ersomel
A/C
Rqmt.

Annual
P ro jected
Load

Total A/C
Costs
{5. 8 ea.)

tm-c:re.v
Mo.nl::ers

p perating
Costs

P ers onne l
Costs

Total
Costs

MATS

RAF

70

6, 720

272

16,7 12

280

1, 200,
230 ,
1, 200,
230,

OOOpsgrs
000 tons
000 psgrs
000 tons

840

$40 6 , 00,0, 000 A TA $230,733,600 $3$00,000

$ 67 0, 333,600

'2 64

1, 577,600 ,000 ATA 803,022,336 11 6,200,000

2,496,822 , 336

1, 200, 000 psgrs
230, 000 tons

II

230,7 33 ,600

!
ATA Estimated Cost Per Flying Hour e quals $ 1,0 25. 10.
SOURCES: Compiled fom data conta ine d in reports :
1. Milita ry Air Trans port S ervice, Airlift Se rvi ce Management Report, July 1958 - June 1962 .
2 . Brewer , S tanley H . and Roger B . Ulvestad, The Car go - J et in Military Air Transportation,
J anuary 19 6 0.

I
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TABLE V
Monthly Flyin g Hour Requireme nt
Round T rips Flying Hours
Pass engers
Atlantic
Pac ific

250
250

~

Total

5 00

11 , 5 00

Cargo
Atlantic
Pa cific

160
160

2, 560
4,800

Total

32 0

7' 360

Grand Total
Atlantic
Pacific

4 10
410

9, 104

~

Total

820

16, 464 /- ZOo/o

SOURCE :

Monthly Flying Hour Capability
MATS {272 A/C) CRAF ({J!/JA/Q

4,000

65, 280

67 ,200

Compiled from data containe d in:
1. The Car go-Jet In Military Air Transportation, Renton,
Wa sh . , 1960.
2 . Strate gic Ai rlift C-141 Star lifter, Marietta, Ga., 1963.
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APPENDIX B
General D escriptions of MATS
C-141 S tar lifter . -- The new Lo ckheed C-141 J et -powered four-engine
aircraft is being built for the U nited States Air Fo rce .

Slated to enter

Military Air Transport S ervice (MATS) global operations in the spring
of 1 9 6 5, it will be capable of airlifting 50,00 0 pounds of cargo 4, 6 00
statute miles, or 20, 000 pounds of cargo nonstop from California to
Japan, a distance of 6, 325 statute miles.
C-135 S tratolifter. --The Boeing C -1 35 Stratolifter is the first pure jet cargo aircraft in military service .

The 500-mph a ircraft, with non-

slop over - ocean range, can fly at twi c e the speed, twice the height, and
can carry three times the load for a 5 0 per cent greater range than most
airplanes MATS uses currently.
3, 6 00 miles at 40, 000 feet.

It can carry 38, 000 pounds of pay load

Basic crew is six .

The aircraft, simila r to the Boeing 7 0 7, is slightl y sm aller in most
dim ensions .

Primarily a cargo carr i er, it c a n be converte d to carry

troops or l itter patients.

I t is the only aircraft now used for aeromedical

evacuation from overseas points to the U nite d States .
was delivered to MA T S in June 1961.
MATS , 29 with turbofan engines.

The first aircraft

Now a total of 44 are in service with
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C-133 Cargomaster. --The Dou gla s C-133 Cargomaster is the l argest
aircraft in the MAT S g lobal airlift inv entory .
carg o, the Cargomaster can airlift all U.

s.

D esigned to h a ndle outsized
operational mi ssil es.

With it

MATS has cut deliv ery time, f rom manufacturer to launch site, to hours
instead of the da y s re quir e d b y over land h a uling .

In D ecember, 1958, a C-1 33 establishe d the world's record for a
single cargo airlift.

I t flew 11 8, 000 poun ds of car g o to an altitude of 10, 000

feet , t opping previous recor d s b y 40, 000 pounds.

T he plane continually

d e monstrates its trem endous capa city by carrying everything from gia nt
missiles to rocket launche rs.
T he Car gomaster n o rmally operates between 15, 000 an d 30, 000 fe et,
cruising at ne a r l y 3 00 miles pe r hour.
more tha n 3, 700 n"liles.

With a 20-ton payload, its range is

It carries a ba sic crew o f fiv e and is powered by

four P ratt a nd W hitney T - 34 t u rboprop e n g ines d eveloping 6, 000 e quiv alent
shaft horsepower eac h.

MATS has 45 of these aircraft, part of them assigne d

to Do ver AFB, Delaware, a n d the others to Travis AFB, California.
C-124 G lob e ma ster . --T he Dou gla s C-124 Glob e master is the backbone
of MATS' air lift forc e .

Introdu ce d to MATS in J une, 1950, it has been in on

every majo r airlift since Ko rea .

It has even becom e a mis s i l e c arrier, air-

l ifting the Thor IRBM and. its compon ent pa r ts to En gland for JRAF use.
This aircraft has flown cargo airdro p missions fo r seven consecutive
years in " Operation DEEP FREEZE," the resupply of scientific stations in
the A nta rc tic .

It bore t he brunt of the Chil e, Con go and C ub a n air lifts.
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It can carry 20 0 full y e q uipped combat troops or 127 litter
patients or a 20-ton c a rgo pay l oad .
1, 808 miles.

With this load it h a s a range of

It s speed is 230 miles per hour a t a normal cruise

a l titude of 7, 000 to 10 , 000 feet .

Its four P ratt a n d W hitne y piston

engines d eve l op 3, 800 horsepower each.
MATS h ad 33 1

C-124 1 s

T he basic crew is six.

in the golbal airlift force on M arch 1,

1 963.
C-118 L iftm ast er . -- The Dou glas C-11 8 L iftmaster , one of the very
dependable passenger and cargo aircraft in MA T S, joined the airlift force
i n S eptember, 195Z.

lt made the first MATS nonstop fli ght a cross the

Atlantic in e a r l y 1954.

The liftmaster had a key ro l e in "Operation SAFE

HAVEN" when 14,000 Hungarian refugees were airlifted to the U. S. in.
late 195'6 and ear l y 1957.
The aircraft can carry 60 co mbat troops and their e quipment and
can deliver them within a r a nge of 2, 760 miles.
feet at 276 miles per hour .

Basic crew is seven .

It c ru ises at 18 , 000
MATS had 110 lift-

masters in the global air lift force on Mar ch 1, 19 63.
C- 1 2 1 S uper Conste llation. --The L ockh ee d C-12 1 S uper Const e llation
joine d MAT S in 1953 and has been used as a convertible carrier for both
c a rgo and personne l.

It fli es both oc eans from i ts two bas es of operation ,

C h arl eston AFB, So uth Caro l ina, and Moffett Naval A ir Station , California.
Besides nor mal passenger and cargo operations , the C-121 is used on the
S tate D epartment "embas sy runs " operating into S outh Am erica.
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The C- 1 21 cruises at 17,000 feet at 282 miles per hour and
carries a basic crew of eight .

All the Super Constellations can be

converted for passengers, cargo or air evacuation missions.

carry 76 fully equipped troops over a 3, 0 5 0 mile range .

It can

MATS had 42

of these in the global airlift force on March 1, 19 63.
C-130 Hercules .- - The extended-range L ockheed C- 1 3 0E He rcules
provides val uab l e interim modernization to the airlift force of MATS.
The first sever al were delivered in August, 1962.
Refinements over the C -1 30B, already in service, give the high wi.nge d He,-cules ]. 0 tons more gross take-of! weight--155, OCO pounds.
Also, additional fuel tanks (between the nacelles of the turboprop engines ),
which each carry 1, 360 gallons, enab l e the "E" version to fly the Atlantic
nonstop with normal load s , and the Pacifi c with one stop.

Rear loading at

tru ck -bed height, ability to land and take off from comparative l y short
r unways and a relative l y high speed (m ore than 300 mph) all make this
aircraft valuabl e for global airlift.
These C-130E aircraft will he l p fi ll MATS' needs even after pure-jet
aircraft de signe d specifically for car go are avail able in m id- 1 964.

It s

normal load is about 1 6 tons and it can carry 64 combat troops or 74
li tter patients .

MATS ha d 48 C -1 30 aircraft on March 1 , 196 3.

Additional

deliveries are being made each month. 1
N O T E: Mileage figures are statute.

Air spee d figures are statute miles / hour.

1 G eneral D escription of MATS Global Airlift Air craft, MATS Public
Information Office Release (S cott AFB, Illinois).
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